

Dec 95

On Hiroshima:

Exonorate bst: Which Pers. would have acted differently?

Hiro? ~~says~~ (major at the Tech, who he was general)

But, as shown by his decisions on H-bomb, as Pers., or New Look? ...

Of course, that was for threat, not attack;
still, look at Korea!

That was after Hiroshima.

Still, it was as Pers. —

CBJ?

JKR? (see CII)

N? ! F? Reagan? Carter? Bush? (refuse to apologize, or re-think?)

see also Clinton!

How about: FDR?

- farms firebombing (see Eds)
- Dresden, Berlin,
- Hiroshima

(How Alp. explains differences between FDR + bst; but now, anti-SU (see next page))

CHURCHILL! (Did he have some own opinion?)

~~How~~ Ag doesn't favor area bombing at high levels - why? (e.g., Tigray, now - on moral-legal grounds?)

// What if Kinshasa would be right?)

argument to
Tigray critique of
de-housing.

→ argue our badly of
doctors of Nazi doctors,
design of experiments,
cost (of "info")

Galtung on FDR/BST:

1. He emphasizes difference, wrt. SU, collab., CW
in BB
↳ But Shriv disagrees.
2. No difference on area bombing — unless
FDR was blocking!
NST resisted this practice:
Not only was present control, but
institutional procedures were in place, functioning
(and lack of challenge, critique in USG)
3. Issue of intimidating SU was less critical
to "decision" than GA makes it;
almost superfluous, not necessary to decision;
not necessary to many aspects of
decision (e.g. failure to offer terms to Japan
was, sufficient on this, less
4. On other side: pass. more FDR concern for
long-run, non-prolif., non-war role,
pro-collab. (more openness to Sjoland-Frank
argument, if he had tried to win it)

5. BUT (vs. GA):

REJECTS BOHR PROPOSAL

FDR (gives in, blocks, to Churchill on this)
rejects collab. with Soviets on A-bomb;
decides on secretary; does this not mean at
vs. "int. control," —
postwar monopoly (with UK)? Would this
not fit with desire to intimidate SU?

AND EVEN BOHR AGREED WITH USE OF BOMB! (close letter from Fermi
attaching to trojaned Pg. but

As for postwar arms race: Why would FDR (like
Churchill) ^{not} have agreed with Comint, et al? or
and for ^{on act} demonstrating; to intimidate, people would
(^{not} protect SU)

ASR: (e.g. US, Congress...) into "int. control"
(What would she have done in 1961? 1964-65?) (IN VN)
and no CBW replacement of N; and the other half
differs a UN from the (not = 54%), N, LBN -

THUS, IF FDR DEATH (cf. JFK death, on VN) MADE NO DIFFERENCE — WHY BLAME
NST / IKE?
or CBW/N?

on FDR (cont.).

-The most one could say is that FDR (+ Stimson?)
might have been more open to persuasion of
Sikorski (and Frank - Rabinowitch) against
an non-use, for long-term; than HST or Byrnes
and perhaps Bard (See, Keay - but
did Keay an action he
wants to HST? or FDR?)

but Sikorski would have been countered by
(Rahr!) Conant, Bush, Grows, Lamson, Compton (!)
~~both~~ Compton

Thus, like the, Straus, McCloy (Ferrell?), byrnes, & much
more was hardly "self-evident"

Military wins (self-evident?) that S&B was not
necessary, militarily, was not the last word,
only concession - or likely to be decisive!

~~that~~ AFTER ALL, VCS thought more
area bombing was not necessary, & then
dictated a shift - but it didn't stop!

(see Aug 14-15!)

- USAF / Arnold motives... (see Keay vs. Arnold:
^{repetitive}
- and Grows / Conant / Oppen motives!
- and Anderson - MacLeish - Hull (vs. Grew) as off to Eng.
^{Byrnes}

(There was an alternative wins - it was "possible"
to be pressed - it was pressed!)

But no proof that it was "possible"
for it to prevail - to be chosen? (That didn't happen -
one alone - wasn't
even considered, at first)

[the use of this word is wrong]

Ambiguities of - NUC Planning
- VV Planning!
not wins, etc.